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Note
Hard Choices: Where To Draw the Line on
Limiting Selection in the Selective Reduction of
Multifetal Pregnancies
Mary A. Scott*
Imagine a hopeful mother, desperate after many failed attempts to become pregnant. She consults a fertility clinic and
decides to undergo the invasive and costly process of in vitro
fertilization (IVF). The procedure is more than successful—she
finds herself pregnant with quadruplets. At less than five feet
tall and with a petite frame, she will not be able to carry all
four fetuses to term. Her doctor recommends an abortion, but
she is unwilling to sacrifice the pregnancy. In 1984, such a patient came to Mark Evans, an obstetrician-geneticist who performed the first procedure now known as selective reduction—
the termination of one or more fetuses in a multifetal pregnan1
cy.
As reproductive technology has become more accessible in
recent years, the number of multifetal pregnancies has sky2
3
rocketed. Due to the risks inherent in multifetal pregnancies,
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1. Liza Mundy, Too Much To Carry?, WASH. POST (May 20, 2007), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051501
730.html.
2. E.g., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics,
Committee Opinion No. 553: Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction, 121 OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 405, 406 (2013) [hereinafter Committee Opinion No. 553] (noting that the birthrate of twins increased 76% between 1980 and 2009 and the
birthrate of triplets increased 400% between 1980 and 1998).
3. See id. (noting the risks of prematurity, cerebral palsy, learning disabilities, slow language development, behavioral difficulties, chronic lung dis-
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the practice of selective reduction has progressed as the num4
bers of such pregnancies has increased. These trends mean
that when fertility treatment is involved, patients and physicians often find themselves in the difficult position of having to
choose which fetus or fetuses to keep. Physicians may select
which fetus to terminate based on proximity to the maternal
5
abdominal wall. In other cases, physicians may consider other
factors including apparent abnormalities, other findings affecting health of a particular fetus, or the parents’ desire to have a
6
child of a particular sex.
As assisted reproduction practices are evolving, so too is
the regulation of reproductive rights in the United States. As of
2015, several states have expanded abortion regulation by enacting laws specifically banning abortions based on the wom7
an’s motivation for seeking an abortion. While most of these
laws target abortions based on the sex of the fetus, an increasing number of states have recently either proposed or passed
laws prohibiting abortions based on the presence of a genetic
8
abnormality such as Down syndrome. At least one state prohibited abortions based on the race of the fetus or a parent of
9
the fetus. There is currently no parallel federal regulation, alt10
hough it has been attempted. Such state laws have been chal11
lenged as unconstitutional, but the debate is not yet resolved.
ease, developmental delay, and death to infants as well as health and economic risks to mothers).
4. See Mundy, supra note 1. The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists distinguishes between selective reduction and multifetal pregnancy reduction: “[i]n multifetal pregnancy reduction, the fetus(es) to be reduced are chosen on the basis of technical considerations, such as which is
most accessible to intervention. In selective reduction, fetuses are chosen on
the basis of health status or sex.” Committee Opinion No. 553, supra note 2, at
408–09. This Note consistently uses “selective reduction” to refer to both
meanings.
5. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple Pregnancy:
Lifeboat Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 781 (1992) [hereinafter Daar, Lifeboat Ethics].
6. See Mark I. Evans, The Truth About Multiple Births, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 2, 2009, at 14.
7. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 510/6 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (2011).
8. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013); S.B. 334, 119th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015); H.B. 439, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo.
2015); H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016).
9. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02.
10. See Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2012, H.R. 3541,
112th Cong. (2012).
11. After the Arizona law’s passage, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Maricopa County Branch (Maricopa NAACP)
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While these laws ban selection (based on genetic abnormality,
sex, or race) specifically in the context of abortions, most do not
purport to ban such selection practices specifically in the con12
text of selective reduction. The assisted reproduction industry
in general and the practices associated with IVF, including se13
lective reduction, are nearly entirely unregulated.
While there is extensive literature examining the ethics of
14
selective reduction and critiquing the regulation of sex selec15
tion in particular, there is currently a gap in research with respect to how motivation-based abortion prohibitions might intersect with the unregulated assisted reproduction industry
and the practice of selective reduction. This intersection raises
questions of whether selective reduction falls within the ambit
16
of state abortion laws, whether motivation-based abortion
17
prohibitions could withstand constitutional scrutiny, and
and the National Asian Pacific American Women’s Forum (NAPAWF) brought
an equal protection claim asserting that “the Act stigmatizes and denigrates
their members on the basis of race and gender,” and that the reasons for the
Act’s passage were based on ill-informed racial stereotypes, discriminating
against their members and causing stigmatic harm. NAACP v. Horne, No.
CV13-01079-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5519514, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2013). The
United States District Court for the District of Arizona determined that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to identify
any personal injury suffered by them.” Id. at *6.
12. Of the states that have enacted motivation-based abortion prohibitions, North Dakota appears to be the only state to explicitly include “the elimination of one or more unborn children in a multifetal pregnancy” in its definition of abortion. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1. Otherwise, where such laws
do not explicitly encompass selective reduction, it is arguable that selective
reduction does not legally constitute abortion. See infra Part II.B.
13. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or
Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 639 (1997) (“A review of federal and state
laws pertaining to the practice of reproductive technologies reveals that practitioners in our country enjoy a nearly regulatory-free environment. A single
inactive federal program and a handful of state laws comprise the total regulatory scheme surrounding [assisted reproductive technologies].”).
14. See, e.g., Committee Opinion No. 553, supra note 2; Daar, Lifeboat
Ethics, supra note 5, at 822–28.
15. Compare, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology
Enabling the Predetermination of a Child’s Gender, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1,
48–61 (1992) (proposing a possible action plan for regulating sex selection),
with David McCarthy, Why Sex Selection Should Be Legal, 27 J. MED. ETHICS
302, 306–07 (2001) (arguing that the major objections to sex selection do not
provide sufficient grounds to limit reproductive liberties).
16. Radhika Rao, Selective Reduction: “A Soft Cover for Hard Choices?” or
Another Name for Abortion?, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 196, 197 (2015) (arguing
that selective reduction and abortion “are points along a continuum that
should not be segregated and analyzed in strict isolation”).
17. See Justin Gillette, Pregnant and Prejudiced: The Constitutionality of
Sex- and Race-Selective Abortion Restrictions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 645, 649
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whether there is a different legal framework that would be
more useful in regulating selection in the context of assisted
reproduction. Answering these questions is important in light
of a political climate in which the continued passage of motivation-based abortion prohibitions and other restrictions on abortion is likely, and the assisted reproduction industry continues
to progress with little regulation.
This Note attempts to fill this gap in scholarship by determining if and to what extent the growing number of motivation-based abortion prohibitions may apply to selective reduction. This Note does not engage in the ethical battle over
whether selective reduction or selective abortions should be
practiced. Rather, it seeks to make a legal argument about
whether and how selection should be regulated as a step in the
selective reduction procedure. Part I investigates the development and current standing of motivation-based abortion prohibitions, discusses the current state of regulation in the assisted
reproduction industry, and introduces the current ethical and
legal frameworks used to discuss selective reduction. Part II
shows how motivation-based abortion prohibitions could create
barriers to women in need of selective reductions by analyzing
the constitutionality of motivation-based abortion prohibitions,
determining how selective reduction fits within the abortion
framework, and investigating how motivation-based abortion
prohibitions may apply to various selective reduction scenarios.
Part III argues that motivation-based abortion prohibitions
should generally not apply in cases of selective reduction and
proposes that state legislatures amend their abortion laws to
better protect selective reduction as a necessary procedure.
Part III then suggests that state legislatures implement reporting requirements to encourage effective self-regulation practices in the assisted reproduction industry and that states mandate that selection be random only in certain narrowly limited
circumstances. While this Note acknowledges that there may
be other barriers to selective reduction beyond the scope of this
proposed solution, it aims to provide an adequate response to
the most pressing obstacle—the increasing number of motivation-based abortion prohibitions.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SEX SELECTION, ABORTION, AND
(2013) (arguing that motivation-based abortion prohibitions cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny); Annie Moskovian, Bans on Sex-Selective Abortions:
How Far Is Too Far?, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423, 439–44 (2013) (concluding that sex selection should be constitutionally protected).
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SELECTIVE REDUCTION
Sex-selective abortion laws and selective reduction have
evolved independently and in response to different concerns.
This independent evolution creates two divergent contexts in
which selection arises. Whereas recent legislation anticipates
selection of fetal characteristics as a motive to seek an abortion,
in the context of selective reduction, selection may arise as an
option once the decision to reduce has already been made. This
Part shows the development of selection practices, the passage
of laws in response to those practices, and recent interpretations and applications of those laws. This Part also examines
current regulation of the assisted reproduction industry and
the ethical and legal frameworks of selective reduction. Specifically, Section A outlines the development of motivation-based
abortion prohibitions in response to a perceived need to address
discriminatory abortion practices in the United States. Section
B then shows that while the constitutionality of these laws has
been litigated, the issue has not been resolved. Section C examines self-regulation practices within the assisted reproduction
industry. Finally, Section D provides an overview of selective
reduction and introduces some of the ethical and legal questions that it presents.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES
While it is unclear whether sex selection is having wide18
spread consequences on the population of the United States, it
is a global issue that has caught the attention of the United
States legislature. The recent trend in state laws banning motivation-based abortions has a complex tangential relationship
19
to the national debate over abortion access more generally.
18. See generally BRIAN CITRO ET AL., REPLACING MYTHS WITH FACTS:
SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2014) (discussing
the prevalence of sex selection in the United States).
19. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“Laws banning sex-selective abortion purport to
combat gender discrimination. However, the text of the laws and the statements made in support of the bans during legislative hearings make it clear
that they are intended to place restrictions on abortion services generally.”);
Jaime Staples King, Not This Child: Constitutional Questions in Regulating
Noninvasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 2, 74 (2012) (“As states that oppose abortion become savvier about ways
to restrict access, their legislative attentions have turned to restricting access
to abortion based on the reason the procedure was sought.”); Kevin L. Boyd,
Comment, The Inevitable Collision of Sex-Determination by Cell-Free Fetal
DNA in Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Diagnosis and the Continual Statewide
Expansion of Abortion Regulation Based on the Sex of the Child, 81 UMKC L.
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This Section examines both the origins and prevalence of sex
selection and the federal and state legislative responses to it.
1. The Development of Selective Abortion Practices
Globally, female children have long been the target of sex
selective practices, and the increased accessibility of reproductive technologies may have exacerbated this disparity in recent
20
years. Sex selection and the male gender preference are typically associated with South, East, and Central Asian countries
where birth ratios are sometimes as high as 130 males per 100
21
females. While some argue that sex selection is also prevalent
in more developed parts of the world, others have cast doubt on
22
whether such disproportionate selection is occurring at all. As
more advanced sex-selective technologies have become availa23
ble, however, it is clear that the option to select for sex has become more accessible to the United States population general24
ly.
Fertility patients may use a number of techniques to idenREV. 417, 453 (2012) (“The Arizona statute is one of the new ways that the anti-choice movement has chosen to attack abortion rights and limit a woman’s
access to abortion services.”).
20. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREVENTING GENDER-BIASED SEX SELECTION 1 (2011), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44577/1/97892415
01460_eng.pdf; Sex-Selective Abortion: Gendercide in the Caucasus, ECONOMIST (Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21586617
-son-preference-once-suppressed-reviving-alarmingly-gendercide-caucasus
(noting that the spread of cheap ultrasound machines have correlated with an
increase in the number of sex-selective abortions in eastern European countries including Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia).
21. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 20, at v.
22. Compare Samuel B. Casey, David B. Waxman & Amy T. Pedagno, No
Girls Allowed: Sex-Selective Abortion and a Guide to Banning It in the United
States, 5 REGENT J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 132–33 (2013) (“[M]ore boys than
girls are born in the United States, by a ratio of 1.05 to 1. But among American families of Chinese, Korean and Indian descent, the likelihood of having a
boy increased to 1.17 to 1 if the first child was a girl . . . [and] if the first two
children were girls, the ratio for a third child was 1.51 to 1—or about 50 percent greater—in favor of boys.” (quoting Sam Roberts, U.S. Births Hint at Bias
for Sons in Some Asians, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes
.com/2009/06/15/nyregion/15babies.html)), with CITRO ET AL., supra note 18
(noting that the findings in the same study were based on outdated data that
excluded several population groups and finding that “[t]he overall sex ratio at
birth for all Asian Americans in the United States is 1.04”).
23. See, e.g., Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics,
Committee Opinion No. 360: Sex Selection, 109 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
475, 476 (2007) [hereinafter Committee Opinion No. 360] (describing three
general methods of sex selection, including prefertilization, postfertilization
and pretransfer, and post-implantation).
24. See Boyd, supra note 19, at 421–22.
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tify and select the sex of a child, and many clinics now adver25
tise the availability of sex selection in the context of IVF. Prior
to fertilization, patients may attempt to increase the likelihood
of conceiving a child of a preferred sex through preimplantation sperm sorting, although there is little evidence
26
confirming the safety or effectiveness of this method. In the
context of IVF, patients often use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) after fertilization to select only male or female
27
embryos for implantation. During pregnancy, patients may select from a number of prenatal methods of sex determination
including amniocentesis, ultrasonography, and chorionic villus
28
sampling. Once the sex of a fetus is identified, the mother may
then decide whether to continue the pregnancy. If sex is identified prior to implantation, then she need only decide whether
and how to proceed with implantation; if sex is identified postimplantation, however, then the only method to select for sex is
29
by abortion. Abortion is the most common method of sex selec30
tion and thus has earned the strongest legislative response.
31
While sex selection for the purpose of “family balancing”

25. See, e.g., Gender Selection, CTR. FOR HUM. REPROD., https://www
.centerforhumanreprod.com/services/infertility-treatments/genderselection/
program (last visited Nov. 29, 2015); Gender Selection, FERTILITY INSTS.,
http://www.fertility-docs.com/programs-and-services/gender-selection/select
-the-gender-of-your-baby-using-pgd.php (last visited Nov. 29, 2015) (advertising “virtually 100% accuracy” of PGD).
26. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 20, at 14–15.
27. See Boyd, supra note 19, at 422. While it may seem that preimplantation selection methods could eliminate the need to consider sex at the
point of selective reduction, not all IVF patients opt for pre-implantation
screening, and those that do typically use the process to detect disease-causing
genes rather than the sex of the fetus. See Gina Kolata, Ethics Questions Arise
as Genetic Testing of Embryos Increases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/health/ethics-questions-arise-as-genetic
-testing-of-embryos-increases.html (noting that an international survey found
that only “2 percent of more than 27,000 uses of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis were made to choose a child’s sex”). Thus, even if PGD is widely used,
there will still be many patients who go through the IVF process without selecting for sex prior to implantation.
28. Id. at 424–26.
29. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 20, at 14.
30. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-496, at 7 (2012) (noting that pre-implantation
techniques “are not widely available or affordable, and make up a small fraction of sex-selection procedures” and that “most sex-selection takes the form of
abortion”).
31. “Family balancing” refers to gender selection “for the purposes of
achieving a more balanced representation of both genders in a family.” Family
Balancing, GENETICS & IVF INST., http://www.givf.com/familybalancing (last
visited Nov. 29, 2015).
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32

generates mixed views in public opinion, the medical community generally considers sex selection to be an acceptable meth33
od of avoiding suspected risks of sex-linked genetic disorders.
Although the underlying moral and ethical justifications for
aborting or reducing a fetus with genetic abnormalities are controversial, this type of selection is common, and almost certain34
ly much more prevalent than selection for sex alone. State legislatures have responded to both types of selection—selection
for sex and selection to avoid a genetic abnormality—by enacting laws prohibiting abortions where the woman’s motivation is
based on the desire for such selection.
2. Legislative Responses to Selective Abortion
In 2012, the United States House of Representatives considered legislation aimed at restricting the practice of sex selec35
tion but did not approve it. Known as the Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA), the bill proposed both criminal and
civil liability for any person who “knowingly performs an abortion knowing that such abortion is sought based on the sex,
gender, color or race of the child, or the race of a parent of that
36
child.” While the issue of race was ultimately dropped from
the bill, leaving the ban on sex selection alone, the bill ulti37
mately failed for other political reasons. Thus, questions of its
32. See Deidre C. Webb, Note, The Sex Selection Debate: A Comparative
Study of Sex Selection Laws in the United States and the United Kingdom, 10
S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 163, 195–96 (2013).
33. See Committee Opinion No. 360, supra note 23, at 475–76.
34. See Mark Leach, North Dakota Enacts Law Banning Down SyndromeSelective Abortion, DOWN SYNDROME PRENATAL TESTING (Mar. 26, 2013),
http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting.com/north-dakota-enacts-law
-banning-down-syndrome-selective-abortion (“[N]ot only is termination following a prenatal diagnosis for conditions like Downs syndrome authorized, it is
the choice most often made by those with a prenatal diagnosis and medical
guidelines require obstetricians to counsel their patient about termination following a prenatal diagnosis.”). Although its precision is debated, the traditionally cited rate of termination following a Down syndrome diagnosis is 90%—
more recent studies cite a rate closer to 75%. See Mark Leach, More Women
Aborting & Continuing Down Syndrome Pregnancies, DOWN SYNDROME PRENATAL TESTING (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting
.com/more-women-aborting-continuing-down-syndrome-pregnancies.
35. See Jennifer Steinhauer, House Rejects Bill To Ban Sex-Selective Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/us/
politics/house-rejects-bill-to-ban-sex-selective-abortions.html.
36. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (PRENDA) of 2012, H.R. 3541, 112th
Cong. (2012).
37. Casey, Waxman & Pedagno, supra note 22, at 140–43; see also
Steinhauer, supra note 35 (noting that on a vote of 246 to 168, the bill fell
short of the two-thirds support required to pass, but that “Republicans did not
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constitutionality and efficacy were never addressed, leaving an
opening for future motivation-based abortion prohibitions at
both the state and federal level.
Congress’s failure to enact a federal motivation-based abortion prohibition has not stopped states from enacting similar
laws. Illinois and Pennsylvania have had such laws since 1985
38
and 1989, respectively. In 2011, Oklahoma and Arizona en39
acted selective abortion prohibitions. In 2013, both North
40
41
Carolina and North Dakota enacted laws prohibiting abortions based on particular fetal characteristics. Other states, including California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia, have also
42
proposed similar legislation. The legislatures of Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and
43
Texas have similar bills before them again in 2015. Thus, at
the time of publishing this Note, there are at least twenty-two
states that have considered or are considering such legislation
and at least six states that have already adopted it.
These laws differ from state to state in theories of liability,
punishment, application, and subject matter. For example, depending on the state, performing a sex-selective abortion may
44
warrant a conviction ranging from a misdemeanor to a felony.
anticipate that the legislation would pass, but saw it as an opportunity to force
Democrats to vote on an issue with appeal among conservatives”).
38. Casey, Waxman & Pedagno, supra note 22, at 143.
39. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1731.2 (2011).
40. S.B. 353, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013) (prohibiting abortions where the sex of the unborn child is a “significant factor” in the woman’s
decision to seek the abortion).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013) (criminalizing abortions based
solely on the sex, genetic abnormality, or potential genetic abnormality of the
fetus).
42. See Casey, Waxman & Pedagno, supra note 22, at 144; Sital Kalantry,
Sex-Selective Abortion Bans: Anti-Immigration or Anti-Abortion?, 16 GEO. J.
INT’L AFFAIRS 140, 150 (2015).
43. H.B. 15-1162, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2015); S.B. 334,
119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015); H.B. 1547, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass.
2015); H.B. 439, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2015); Bill No. A06545,
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015);
S.B. 108, 78th Gen. Assemb. (Or. 2015); H.B. 2986, 78th Gen. Assemb. (Or.
2015); H.B. 113, 84th Gen. Assemb. (Tex. 2014).
44. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (classifying the performance of a
sex-selective reduction as a class 3 felony); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1
(classifying the performance of a sex-selective reduction as a class A misdemeanor); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (2011) (classifying the performance

1220

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1211

A violation can also result in additional punishments ranging
45
from damages and fines to injunction and license revocation.
None of the existing laws impose liability on the woman upon
whom the abortion was performed.
While most of these laws apply only in limited circumstances, some may apply more broadly. Importantly, most of
46
these laws include the word “solely.” The word “solely” limits
the laws’ application to circumstances where a particular fetal
characteristic is the only factor in the decision to seek an abortion. Arizona’s law does not contain this limitation. It provides
that “if sex is even one of the factors or aspects of the pregnant
woman’s decision for terminating the pregnancy, whether due
to gender-linked disorders or family balancing, the abortion is
illegal and cannot be performed, or must be reported if per47
formed.” The laws that apply the most broadly only require
that the decision to seek an abortion be “related to the sex” of
48
the fetus.
Finally, while most of these laws only seek to prevent abortions based on sex, an increasing number also aim to prevent
abortions based on genetic abnormality. Such laws have been
proposed in Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio and signed into law in
49
North Dakota. Provisions banning both types of selection raise
of a sex-selective reduction as a third-degree felony); H.B. 1585, 97th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2014) (making a violation of the law a class A misdemeanor or a class D felony if the person has previously pled guilty to or been
convicted of a violation).
45. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (providing a civil cause of
action for money damages to either the father of the unborn child if he was
married to the mother at the time of the abortion, or to the mother’s parents if
the mother is under 18); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (2011) (providing a
cause of action for injunctive relief and actual or punitive damages by the
woman upon whom the abortion was performed or her family members,
healthcare provider, a district attorney, or the Attorney General); Mo. H.B.
1585 (imposing liability for damages, license suspension or revocation, and injunction).
46. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-731.2 (imposing liability for “knowingly or recklessly perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform an abortion with
knowledge that the pregnant female is seeking the abortion solely on account
of the sex of the unborn child” (emphasis added)); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
510/6 (2010) (prohibiting abortions sought “solely on account of the sex of the
fetus”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (prohibiting physicians from performing any abortion that is not “necessary” and excluding abortions sought “solely” because of the sex of the unborn child from the definition of a “necessary”
abortion).
47. Boyd, supra note 19, at 435.
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.121 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (criminalizing abortions
based solely on the existence of a genetic abnormality or potential genetic abnormality); S.B. 334, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015) (prohibiting
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constitutional questions regarding a woman’s right to a previability abortion and the legitimacy of states’ interests in preventing discrimination, which are discussed in further detail in
Part II.
B. INTERPRETING AND VALIDATING MOTIVATION-BASED
ABORTION PROHIBITIONS
This Section provides the foundation for analyzing how
state laws restricting motivation-based abortions would stand
up against a constitutional challenge. Part I.B.1 briefly explains the current state of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the validity of state abortion laws. Then, Part I.B.2 examines the challenges that have been brought against recently
enacted motivation-based abortion prohibitions, finding that
none of the laws have been challenged on grounds that give the
Supreme Court an opportunity to actually review their constitutionality.
1. Current Judicial Standards for State Abortion Laws
The Court in Roe v. Wade established a woman’s right to
have an abortion prior to fetal viability, but provided that
states could “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion [after viability] except where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of
50
the life or health of the mother.” In Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court expanded
states’ ability to regulate, based on the “substantial state interest in protecting potential life throughout pregnancy,” by allowing pre-viability regulations that do not pose an “undue bur51
den” on a woman’s right to have a pre-viability abortion.
the performance of an abortion on a woman who is seeking the abortion solely
because of “a diagnosis or potential diagnosis of the fetus having Down syndrome or any other disability”); H.B. 439, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo.
2015) (prohibiting the performance of an abortion on a pregnant woman who is
known to be seeking the abortion “solely because the unborn child has been
diagnosed with either Down syndrome or a potential for Down syndrome” or
solely because the unborn child has been diagnosed with “either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic abnormality”); H.B. 135, 131st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (prohibiting the performance of “an
abortion on a pregnant woman who is seeking the abortion because of a test
result indicating Down Syndrome in an unborn child or a prenatal diagnosis of
Down Syndrome in an unborn child”). North Carolina’s law could also be interpreted to apply to abortions sought on the basis of genetic abnormality
where those abnormalities are sex-linked. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9021.121 (explaining that the woman’s decision to seek an abortion need only be
“related” to the sex of the fetus).
50. 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
51. 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 (1992).
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52

Recently, courts have both upheld and struck down several
state abortion regulations under the Casey “undue burden”
53
standard.
The Supreme Court’s statements in Casey suggest that the
Court may uphold an abortion ban that applies prior to viability, as long as it is a narrow ban justified by a state interest not
54
considered in either Roe or Casey. In Roe, the Court struck
down a Texas statute outlawing abortions at any time except to
save the life of the mother, while the Casey Court upheld a
statutory provision prohibiting a minor from having an abortion without parental consent, unless a court is able to determine that she “is mature and capable of giving informed consent and has in fact given her informed consent, or that an
55
abortion would be in her best interests.” In doing so, the Court
considered state interests in protecting potential life, safe56
guarding women’s health, and protecting minors. The Court
has yet to consider the validity of state interests in eliminating
discrimination in the context of abortion.
States justify motivation-based abortion prohibitions as a
57
means of eliminating discrimination. While states’ interest in
eliminating discrimination has not yet been examined in the
context of abortion law, it has been considered in the context of
58
laws affecting expressive associational rights. Because the
Supreme Court has upheld statutes that infringed on groups’
associational rights based on the states’ compelling interest in
eliminating sex discrimination, there is a valid argument that
52. See Gillette, supra note 17, at 661 (noting that the Supreme Court has
upheld state laws requiring doctors to inform women of the availability of materials regarding the physical characteristics of the fetus, requiring women to
wait twenty-four hours before having an abortion, and requiring minors to obtain parental consent and notification).
53. See Thomas J. Molony, Roe, Casey, and Sex-Selection Abortion Bans,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1105–09 (2014) (discussing several recent cases
in which federal courts have struck down state “fetal pain” statutes and “fetal
heartbeat statutes” on the grounds that they unconstitutionally burdened a
woman’s right to have a pre-viability abortion).
54. See id. at 1111.
55. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899; see also Molony, supra note 53, at 1111–12.
56. Molony, supra note 53, at 1113–14.
57. See King, supra note 19, at 56–62 (identifying a legitimate state interest in social integrity based on the potential social harms resulting from widespread discriminatory selective abortions that would justify the regulation of
noninvasive prenatal genetic diagnosis).
58. See Molony, supra note 53, at 1118–23 (discussing three cases in
which the Supreme Court considered whether statutes prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation unconstitutionally infringed on groups’ associational rights).
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the same interest would justify a ban on selective abortions as
long as it imposes no more than “a slight infringement on a
59
woman’s right to choose.” The sex of a fetus alone has little to
no relation to the mother’s health, the burdens and distresses
of raising and caring for a child, or the mother’s liberty, so “any
infringement that a narrow sex selection ban might impose on
a woman’s right to choose reasonably [could] be characterized
60
as slight or insubstantial.” Thus, it is possible that the Court
would reject any future facial challenges to these statutes, because there is a significant state interest in preventing sex discrimination, and eliminating the choice to have a boy as opposed to a girl (or a girl as opposed to a boy) poses no undue
61
burden.
In scrutinizing the constitutionality of state abortion laws,
the Supreme Court is also likely to be influenced by traditional
canons of interpretation. When ruling on the constitutionality
of state statutes, the Supreme Court will adhere to the “cardinal principle” that, before declaring a statute unconstitutional,
it will look for any “fairly possible” construction of the statute
62
“by which the question may be avoided.” Although the Court
has applied this canon inconsistently in abortion cases, it is
possible that it will still influence the Court to uphold motivation-based abortion statutes in some form. In Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Justices
O’Connor and White identified “an unprecedented canon of construction under which ‘in cases involving abortion, a permissi63
ble reading of a statute is to be avoided at all costs.’” But,
more recently, the Court adhered to the “cardinal principle” in
Gonzales v. Carhart, concluding that “[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance . . . extinguishes any lingering doubt as to
64
whether the Act covers [dilation and evacuation].” Justice
59. Id. at 1123–24.
60. Id. at 1129.
61. This analysis is also likely to apply to some degree to laws prohibiting
abortions based on a genetic abnormality of the fetus, given the legitimacy of
states’ interest in eliminating other forms of discrimination. See supra note 49
and accompanying text.
62. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 629 (1993) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
62 (1932); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.740, 749–50 (1961)).
63. 476 U.S. 747, 829 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 812
(White, J., dissenting)).
64. 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007). Having determined that the law at issue in
that case would have been unconstitutional if it prohibited the procedure of
dilation and evacuation (D & E), the Court held that “the most reasonable
reading and understanding” of the statute was that it did not prohibit that
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Kennedy opined that this principle had, “in the past, fallen by
the wayside when the Court confronted a statute regulating
65
abortion,” but the Supreme Court and circuit courts generally
66
adhered to it in cases subsequent to Gonzales. Therefore, the
canon of constitutional avoidance is likely to continue to influence the courts when confronted with abortion statutes in future cases.
2. Constitutional Challenges to Existing State Laws Banning
Motivation-Based Abortions
In 1993, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois enjoined enforcement of Illinois’s ban on sex67
selective abortion in cases of pre-viability abortion. While this
result suggests that the enforcement of similar laws in other
states may also be enjoined, it does not suggest how the Supreme Court might rule. There are few other examples of
courts deciding the constitutionality of these laws, particularly
in more recent years.
After the Arizona legislature passed the state’s current
law, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) and the National Asian Pacific American
Women’s Forum (NAPAWF) filed a lawsuit challenging its con68
stitutionality. The claim alleged that the Act denied equal
protection by perpetuating racially discriminatory stereotypes
about Black, Asian and Pacific Islander women, Asian culture,
69
and abortion care. The United States District Court for the
District of Arizona dismissed the claim on the grounds that the
plaintiffs “fail[ed] to identify any personal injury suffered by
procedure, and therefore it could not be found invalid on its face on those
grounds. Id. at 153–56.
65. Id. at 153.
66. See, e.g., id.; Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686
F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (adopting a construction of a suicide advisory provision in a South Dakota statute so as to avoid a constitutional question); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 176–77 (4th Cir. 2009)
(upholding a Virginia statute based on a narrow interpretation that the law
“criminalizes both the intentional intact D & E and the accidental intact D &
E, but only where the necessary scienter is present and no affirmative defense
is presented”). But see Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health
Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “whether the
Supreme Court applies this rule in the same way in abortion cases is uncertain”).
67. Herbst v. O’Malley, No. 84 C 5602, 1993 WL 59142, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 2, 1993).
68. NAACP v. Horne, No. CV13-01079-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 5519514 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 3, 2013); Complaint, Horne, 2013 WL 5519514.
69. Horne, 2013 WL 5519514, at *2.
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them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error,” and
70
thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court
based its holding on Allen v. Wright, which “makes clear that
stigmatizing injury alone is not sufficient for standing in equal
protection cases,” and that plaintiffs must show that they “per71
sonally have been denied equal treatment.” The Red River
Women’s Clinic, North Dakota’s only abortion clinic, brought a
similar challenge against North Dakota’s H.B. 1305 banning
72
abortions on the basis of either sex or genetic abnormality.
However, the clinic ultimately dropped its claim “because it de73
termined that the law doesn’t apply to its practice.” In 2013,
the NAACP v. Horne plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Ninth Cir74
cuit. Oral argument is currently scheduled for December 9,
75
2015.
C. REGULATING ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
While the number of laws affecting reproductive rights in
the United States has grown in recent years, they have almost
76
exclusively focused on issues like abortion and birth control,
leaving practices in the assisted reproduction industry relative-

70. Id. at *8.
71. Id. at *5 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.737 (1984)).
72. Jessica Mason Pieklo, Lawsuit Filed Challenging North Dakota PreViability Ban, RH REALITY CHECK (June 25, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://
rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/06/25/lawsuit-filed-challenging-north-dakota
-pre-viability-ban.
73. Jessica Mason Pieklo, Red River Clinic Asks Court To Dismiss Its Legal Challenge to Sex-Selection and Fetal Anomaly Bans, RH REALITY CHECK
(Sept. 12, 2013, 1:04 PM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/09/12/red-river
-clinic-asks-court-to-dismiss-its-legal-challenge-to-sex-and-fetal-anomaly-bans.
74. Brief of Appellants, NAACP v. Horne, No. 13-17247 (9th Cir. filed
Mar. 12, 2014), 2014 WL 1153838. Oral argument was scheduled at the time
this Note was being published. Appellants’ Acknowledgment of Hearing Notice, NAACP v. Horne, No. 13-17247 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 1, 2015). Even if the
Ninth Circuit or another federal court later finds motivation-based abortion
prohibitions to be unconstitutional, this Note recognizes that states can and
likely will modify these laws to comply. See infra Part II.A. For example, Arizona and North Dakota might remove the ban on abortions based on race or
genetic abnormality, while keeping the provision banning abortions based on
sex, and all states may modify their sex-selective abortion laws to apply only
prior to viability.
75. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
76. See Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Marking the Fine Line: Ethics and the Regulation of Innovative Technologies in Human Reproduction, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 685, 698 (2010); see, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2751 (2014) (addressing the issue of employer opposition to certain methods of insurance-supplied birth control methods).
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77

ly untouched by regulation. The only federal law currently
pertaining to assisted reproduction technologies is the Fertility
78
Clinic Success Rate and Certification act of 1992. This law requires fertility clinics to annually report their pregnancy success rates and certification status to the Secretary of Health
79
and Human Services through the Centers for Disease Control.
Some states, including Arizona, California, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have proposed their own
80
laws pertaining to fertility practices. In 2013, the Arizona legislature produced a bill proposing exhaustive requirements for
fertility clinics to report the total number of live births
achieved; the rate of live births per transfer; the percentage of
live births per completed cycle of egg retrieval; the percentage
of transferred embryos that implant; specific information regarding the safekeeping of embryos; the percentage of pregnancies resulting in multifetal pregnancies, broken down by the
number of fetuses; the percentage of live births having multiple
infants; the number of selective reductions performed, broken
down by the number of embryos transferred before the reduction; the percentage of selective reductions that resulted in a
miscarriage; the percentage of premature births per single and
multiple births; and the percentage of birth defects per single
81
and multiple births. If enacted, this law would have been the
broadest external regulation of the ART industry.
Given the considerable variance in clinic success rates, the
expense of assisted reproduction, and the potential impact on
patient health, some regulation of the ART industry is needed.
However, there are also valid arguments against such regula82
tion. First, the industry already self-regulates in many ways.
For example, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM) and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
83
(SART) regularly issue guidelines for the ART industry.
77. See Daar, supra note 13; Sandra T. Jimenez, Note, “My Body, My
Right”: A Look into IVF Regulation Through the Abortion Legal Framework,
33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 375, 384–85 (2012) (“Current ART regulation exists
in the form of voluntary and legally unenforceable guidelines created collaboratively by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) in lieu of federal or state
statutes.”).
78. See Daar, supra note 13, at 642.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-1(a) (2012).
80. See Daar, supra note 13, at 646–50.
81. S.B. 1376, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013).
82. See Daar, supra note 13, at 658–60; Lyerly, supra note 76, at 702.
83. See Daar, supra note 13, at 658–59; Jimenez, supra note 77, at 384–
86.
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ASRM continuously refines its guidelines for IVF embryo transfers in an effort to reduce the number of high-order multiple
84
pregnancies. Second, such regulation risks running afoul of
85
fundamental procreative liberties. While some regulation of
ART is appropriate, regulations like that proposed in Arizona
could possibly undermine those liberties by burdening providers with redundant requirements and passing the added costs
86
on to patients.
D. ETHICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF SELECTIVE
REDUCTION
Since the first successful birth of an infant conceived
through IVF in 1978, this technique has grown worldwide to
become one of the most popular methods of assisted reproduc87
tion. Along with this success, however, arise a number of complications. The process of IVF, in short, involves treating the
mother with fertility drugs to increase the production of eggs,
retrieving and fertilizing the eggs outside of the mother’s uterus, and later transferring the healthy embryos back into the
84. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Criteria for Number of Embryos to Transfer: A Committee Opinion, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 44, 44 (2013), http://www
.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_
Guidelines/Guidelines_and_Minimum_Standards/Guidelines_on_number_of_
embryos(1).pdf (issuing a new set of guidelines, further refining the guidelines
last issued in 2009, reducing the recommended number of embryos to transfer
to a single embryo for women under 35, no more than two embryos for women
between 35 and 37, no more than three embryos for women 38 to 40, and no
more than five embryos for women 41 to 42).
85. See Daar, supra note 13, at 641–42 (considering Supreme Court decisions protecting procreative liberties by affirming the constitutional right not
to procreate and opining that “[a]ny regulation of ART that has the effect of
interfering with procreational choices could be invalidated as interfering with
fundamental rights”); Jimenez, supra note 77, at 391. But see Radhika Rao,
Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1077, 1113–21 (1998) (opining that procreational rights are based in the
constitutional right to privacy and as such, are limited).
86. See, e.g., Arizona Legislators Put Fertility Clinics Under Microscope
(Arizona Nightly News television broadcast) (noting that the CDC already
publishes much of the information sought by the Arizona bill), http://archive
.azcentral.com/video/#/Arizona+legislators+put+fertility+clinics+under+
microscope/2189339366001; Letter from RESOLVE: The National Infertility
Association to Arizona Senator Andy Biggs (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www
.resolve.org/get-involved/the-center-for-infertility-justice/state-legislation/
resolves-letter-to-arizona-senators.pdf (noting that because Arizona law does
not require insurers to cover infertility treatment, any added costs would fall
to patients).
87. See Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 789–90 (noting that as of
1992, over 10,000 IVF infants had been delivered worldwide, and more than
180 IVF programs were operating in the United States).
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88

mother’s uterus. Physicians originally took an aggressive approach to transferring embryos to increase the mother’s chance
89
of pregnancy. Because IVF patients make substantial financial and emotional investments in the process, IVF physicians
naturally experience pressure to get results faster by transfer90
ring higher numbers of embryos. Furthermore, IVF is a competitive industry where fertility clinics have a “vested stake in
91
the outcome of fertility treatments” and thus an incentive to
continue higher-order transfers. Although they are not legally
binding, ASRM guidelines may temper some of this pressure by
92
limiting the number of recommended transfers. High-order
transfer rates have dropped since the late 1998, when the
93
ASRM first published these guidelines. Despite the industry’s
great strides in reducing the number of high-order multiples
produced through IVF, it has not yet succeeded in reducing the
94
number of twins. The CDC reports that while the birth rate
for triplets and higher-order multiples dropped four percent between 2012 and 2013, the twin birth rate increased by two per95
cent, reaching a new high of 33.7 per 1,000 births.
88. Id. at 790.
89. Id. at 791.
90. See Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice: Multiple
Births, Selective Reduction and Abortion, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 29,
50–51 (2000).
91. Id. at 50.
92. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
93. See Tarun Jain et al., Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice and in Outcomes of the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1639, 1641 (2004). Patterns of embryo-transfer practice are
likely also influenced by other factors, such as improvements in technology. Id.
at 1643–44. Patient preference is also likely to influence embryo-transfer practices, as many fertility patients desire multifetal pregnancies and may prefer
to transfer higher numbers of embryos. See Ginny L. Ryan et al., The Desire of
Infertile Patients for Multiple Births, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 500, 503
(2004) (noting that one in five women in one study listed multiple births as
their most desired outcome of infertility treatment).
94. The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology’s 2013 national data
summary showed that twin births constituted 28.2% of live births for women
under 35, which was a decrease from 29.5% in 2012, 30.8% in 2011, 32.4% in
2010, 33.3% in 2008, and 32.7% in 2004. Clinic Summary Report, SOC’Y FOR
ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_Public
MultYear.aspx?ClinicPKID=0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2015); see also Laurie
Tarkan, Lowering Odds of Multiple Births, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, at F1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/health/19mult.html (stating that while
efforts to reduce multiples by transferring fewer embryos per IVF cycle have
“substantially lowered the rates of triplets . . . they have not made a dent in
the twin rate”).
95. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2013, 64 NAT’L VITAL
STATS. REPS. 1, 2 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_
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While transferring higher numbers of embryos increases
the chances of pregnancy, it also increases the odds of
96
multifetal pregnancy. Because of the high risks associated
with multifetal pregnancies, physicians will often urge their
97
patients to consider selective reduction. The procedure has become more common since it was first performed, with one cen98
ter reporting more than 2,000 procedures by 2008. The technical process of selective reduction, performed in the first
trimester, involves inserting a needle into the chest or heart of
the fetus and injecting potassium chloride, after which “[t]he
terminated fetuses remain in the woman’s uterus where they
are resorbed, allowing the remaining fetuses to grow normal99
ly.” Although most physicians determine which fetus to ter100
minate by proximity to the maternal abdominal wall, some
have said that they will consider other factors including genetic
abnormalities or the parents’ preference to have a child of a
101
particular sex. Over time, physicians have performed more
102
selective reductions with increasing success, but the proce103
dures are still not without risk.
Because of the nature of the procedure, scholars frequently
01.pdf.
96. See Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 84 (“High-order multiple
pregnancy (three or more implanted embryos) is an undesirable consequence .
. . of assisted reproductive technologies.”); supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
97. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
98. Joanne Stone et al., Contemporary Outcomes with the Latest 1000
Cases of Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction (MPR), AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, Oct. 2008, at 406.e1, http://www.ajog.org/article/S0002-9378(08)
00627-3/pdf (referring to Mount Sinai Medical Center).
99. Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 780–81.
100. Id. at 781.
101. See Evans, supra note 6; see also Ruth Padawer, The Two-Minus-One
Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/
14/magazine/the-two-minus-one-pregnancy.html (noting that although most
doctors once refused to offer sex selection, “that ethical demarcation has eroded” in the last decade).
102. Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 788 (noting that United States
physicians reported over 200 procedures by 1992, as well as a decrease in the
fetal loss rate from 33.3% to 9.5%, compared to the general fetal mortality rate
of 16% to 41% among multifetal pregnancies).
103. See Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 84 (stating that selective
reduction “may result in the loss of all fetuses, does not completely eliminate
the risks associated with multiple pregnancy, and may have adverse psychological consequences”); see also Kathleen Lee, In Support of a Gender-Neutral
Framework for Resolving Selective Reduction Disputes, 44 FAM. L.Q. 135, 140–
41 (2010) (noting that “selective reduction carries with it heavy psychological
burdens” and also produces moral and ethical dilemmas for parents considering the procedure).
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compare and distinguish selective reduction and abortion.
While both involve the termination of one or more fetuses, the
two procedures differ in technical respects, context, and objec105
tives. Abortions are performed in an “increasingly hostile” political and regulatory climate, but “selective reduction occurs in
the context of the vast, widely-used and largely unregulated
106
Whereas a pregnant woman typically
fertility industry.”
seeks an abortion because her pregnancy is unwanted, selective
reduction takes place after the mother has gone to significant
107
Most state abortion
lengths seeking to become pregnant.
laws, however, do not explicitly consider these distinctions in
motivation; rather, they define abortion as “the termination of
108
a human pregnancy.” The aim of selective reduction is not to
terminate a pregnancy, but to preserve it along with the health
109
of the mother and remaining fetus. In spite of these differences, some scholars consider the two procedures legally identi110
cal. The extent of a pregnant woman’s power to choose which
fetus to terminate by selective reduction in a state with laws
prohibiting motivation-based abortions requires an analysis of
how selective reduction might fit within the legal definition of
abortion.
II. HOW MOTIVATION-BASED ABORTION LAWS COULD
CREATE BARRIERS TO WOMEN SEEKING SELECTIVE
REDUCTIONS
While selective reduction is not without its ethical questions, physicians consider the procedure ethical and even nec111
essary in many situations. Nonetheless, the growing prevalence of motivation-based abortion prohibitions across the
112
country may create significant barriers to women seeking this
104. See, e.g., Pinchuk, supra note 90, at 34–51. See generally Rao, supra
note 16 (discussing the legal and ethical distinctions between the procedures).
105. See Pinchuk, supra note 90, at 34–51.
106. Id. at 50.
107. See id. at 34.
108. Lee, supra note 103, at 145.
109. See id. at 144.
110. See, e.g., John Robertson, Is Selective Reduction Covered by State
Abortion Law?, HARV. L. SCH.: BILL OF HEALTH BLOG (Apr. 10, 2013), http://
blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/04/10/john-robertson-on-is-selective
-reduction-covered-by-state-abortion-law-online-abortion-and-reproductive
-technology-symposium.
111. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
112. As of the time of writing this Note, there are at least six states that
have enacted motivation-based abortion prohibitions and at least ten states
that have proposed such legislation, although it has yet to be enacted. See su-
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vital procedure. Although there are many other factors that
could have a chilling effect on physicians providing selective
113
reduction, this Note focuses on motivation-based abortion
prohibitions as the most pressing barrier.
Section A first probes the constitutional validity of laws
prohibiting abortions on the basis of motivation, then, assuming such laws are not unconstitutional per se, identifies which
laws are most likely to pass constitutional muster. Second, assuming such laws are generally valid, Section B considers their
application to selective reduction, concluding that while there
is a strong argument that selective reduction should not legally
qualify as abortion, states may still seek to apply motivationbased abortion prohibitions in cases of selective reduction. Finally, to the extent that these laws validly limit the availability
of selective reduction, Section C considers the implications of
such laws in the types of cases where a particular fetal characteristic is more likely to be an ethically relevant consideration
as part of a selective reduction decision.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIABILITY OF MOTIVATION-BASED
ABORTION PROHIBITIONS
114

Some have challenged these laws as discriminatory, but
the Supreme Court has not yet determined their constitutional115
ity. Despite the likelihood that many of these laws are inva116
lid, some have a significant chance of survival. This Section
applies recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on state abortion
laws, discussed in Part I.B, to determine which states’ laws
117
would be the most likely to survive a constitutional challenge.
This Section concludes that while there is a strong argument
pra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
113. See Christine E. Dehlendorf & Kevin Grumbach, Medical Liability Insurance As a Barrier to the Provision of Abortion Services in Family Medicine,
98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1770, 1770–71 (2008) (finding that “[t]he cost and
availability of liability insurance have emerged as a prominent barrier” for
family physicians providing abortions).
114. See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
115. Gillette, supra note 17, at 671; King, supra note 19, at 30; Molony, supra note 53, at 1092.
116. Even if they are found to be unconstitutional, this Note acknowledges
that many state legislatures are likely to reenact modified versions of these
statutes. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
117. While a full analysis of the constitutionality of these additional prohibitions is outside the scope of this Note, a full analysis is not necessary to the
analysis below, which explores how these prohibitions would apply in several
hypothetical scenarios assuming that the prohibitions are upheld or remain
unchallenged.

1232

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:1211

that constitutional protection should extend to any reason a
118
woman may have for seeking pre-viability abortion, states
may permissibly impose limitations on pre-viability abortions
in narrow, limited circumstances.
119
120
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Roe and Casey create
the judicial standard that the Court will use to determine how
far states can go in limiting a woman’s right to have an abortion based on her motivation. If a court interprets Casey to bar
only blanket or comprehensive pre-viability abortion bans but
allow some narrower bans, then the narrowest motivationbased abortion prohibitions are those most likely to be upheld.
None of the state laws discussed in Part I.A.2 of this Note contain provisions limiting their application to post-viability abortions. Thus, they would all be subject to Casey’s undue burden
test for pre-viability abortion bans, should the Court choose
this route. The laws most likely to survive this test are those
that apply only to abortions sought “solely” on the basis of the
sex of the fetus. This limitation would allow a woman to consider the sex of the fetus where her decision to terminate her
pregnancy is ultimately influenced by other, permissible reasons.
Those laws that purport to apply the most broadly—North
Carolina’s and Arizona’s—are the least likely to survive a constitutional challenge. North Carolina’s law applies even where
sex selection is merely one among other reasons for terminating
a pregnancy, and it contains no exceptions relating to the
121
preservation of the life or health of the mother. The Arizona
law is also problematic because it may apply in any scenario in
which a pregnant woman considers the sex of the fetus in her
122
decision to opt for an abortion. Because they are limited in
scope, most other states’ laws are more likely to survive the Casey undue burden test, should Casey be interpreted to allow
narrow pre-viability abortion prohibitions. Even if the Court
determines that such laws are unconstitutional because they
limit a woman’s choice to have an abortion prior to viability,
state legislatures can easily modify their laws to apply only
post-viability (in states in which a post-viability abortion is
otherwise permitted).
In contrast to laws only prohibiting abortions for the pur118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Gillette, supra note 17, at 671–81; King, supra note 19, at 30–43.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See Molony, supra note 53, at 1130.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011).
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pose of sex selection, those that also prohibit abortions based on
other qualities, such as genetic abnormality or race, raise more
complex questions. If the state has a compelling interest in
eliminating discrimination based on sex, it follows that the
state might also have a compelling interest in eliminating other
123
forms of discrimination. However, these laws may face additional hurdles in passing the undue burden test, even if Casey
is interpreted to allow some narrow pre-viability abortion bans.
Arizona’s prohibition on race-selective abortions is similar to
prohibitions on sex-selective abortions, because like the sex of
the fetus, the race of the fetus does little to affect the woman’s
124
health or the burdens of raising a child. Thus, laws that prohibit abortions based solely on genetic abnormality may be less
likely to survive a constitutional challenge because, unlike sex
or race, a genetic abnormality may impose significant financial,
125
medical, and emotional burdens on the mother.
B. SELECTIVE REDUCTION ON THE SPECTRUM OF ABORTION
As discussed above, scholars have identified a number of
126
ways to distinguish selective reduction from abortion. While
the two procedures are conceptually and ethically separable,
their legal separability is less clear. Ultimately, the legal status
of selective reduction depends on statutory interpretation, as
selective reduction is not mentioned explicitly in most state
127
abortion statutes. Using a statutory purpose approach, “a
123. See Moloney, supra note 53, at 1118–19 (noting several cases in which
the Supreme Court considered whether public accommodation statutes prohibiting discrimination based on race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation infringed on a group’s associational rights using a balancing test, rather than
applying strict scrutiny).
124. Cf. Clifford Ward, Suit Filed over Mix-Up at Downers Grove Sperm
Bank Is Dismissed, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
suburbs/downers-grove/news/ct-dupage-sperm-bank-suit-met-0904-20150903
-story.html (reporting that in dismissing this case, the judge agreed that an
action for “‘wrongful birth’ could not be legally sustained in a case where a
healthy child was born”).
125. See Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 842 n.306 (noting that
courts have allowed damages in wrongful birth actions including the expenses
of ordinary and extraordinary medical care and education of a disabled child,
the expenses of pain and suffering of the mother during pregnancy, and the
emotional distress of the parents); Padawer, supra note 101 (“What drives [the
decision to abort a fetus with an identified genetic condition] is not just concern over the quality of life for the future child but also the emotional, financial or social difficulty for parents of having a child with extra needs.”).
126. See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text.
127. At times, the Supreme Court has used this method of statutory interpretation where the words of the statute themselves do not provide adequate
clarity. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106
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natural reading” of most abortion statutes would determine
that they include selective reduction, “[s]ince protection of fe128
tuses is a main purpose of such statutes.” A more technical,
129
strictly language-based interpretation, however, can substantiate a plausible argument that selective reduction should not
be covered.
Most of the state laws discussed in Part I.A.2 of this Note
define abortion in nearly identical terms. Arizona law, for example, defines abortion as “the use of any means to terminate
the clinically diagnosable pregnancy of a woman with
knowledge that the termination by those means will cause,
130
with reasonable likelihood, the death of the unborn child.” It
excludes “the use of any means to save the life or preserve the
health of the unborn child, to preserve the life or health of the
child after a live birth, to terminate an ectopic pregnancy or to
131
remove a dead fetus.” The language in the Oklahoma, Illinois,
132
and Pennsylvania statutes is very similar.
North Dakota’s law is unique because it explicitly includes
selective reduction in the definition of abortion. The law defines
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (2006) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)) (“[T]he Court employed a purposivist approach to
manufacture statutory clarity and to overrule an agency interpretation that
otherwise seemed well within the bounds of the statutory text.”).
128. Robertson, supra note 110.
129. The Supreme Court has long used the “plain language rule” as the
starting point of statutory construction. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) (“[I]n all cases involving statutory construction, ‘our starting point must be the language employed by Congress,’ . . .
and we assume ‘that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used.’” (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S.
63, 68 (1982))); United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929)
(“[W]here the language of an enactment is clear, and construction according to
its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words
employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.”).
130. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (2015).
131. Id.
132. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/2 (2010) (defining abortion as “the use of any
instrument, medicine, drug or any other substance or device to terminate the
pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with an intention other than to
increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the
child after live birth, or to remove a dead fetus”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-730
(2011) (defining abortion as “the use or prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or device intentionally to terminate the
pregnancy of a female known to be pregnant with an intention other than to
increase the probability of a live birth, [or] to preserve the life or health of the
child after live birth”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (West 2011) (defining
abortion as “[t]he use of any means to terminate the clinically diagnosable
pregnancy of a woman with knowledge that the termination by those means
will, with reasonable likelihood, cause the death of the unborn child”).
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abortion as “the act of using or prescribing any instrument,
medicine, drug, or any other substance, device, or means with
the intent to terminate the clinically diagnosable intrauterine
pregnancy of a woman, including the elimination of one or more
unborn children in a multifetal pregnancy, with knowledge that
the termination by those means will with reasonable likelihood
133
cause the death of the unborn child.” Other states’ abortion
laws do not refer to multifetal pregnancies or selective reduction.
Selective reduction does not precisely fit within most
states’ statutory definitions of abortion. State laws generally
134
define abortion in terms of terminating a pregnancy. The
purpose of a selective reduction is not to terminate pregnancy,
but to preserve the pregnancy along with the health of both the
135
pregnant woman and the remaining fetuses. North Dakota’s
is the only law that anticipates multifetal pregnancies and explicitly includes selective reduction in its definition of abortion,
suggesting that North Dakota is the only state where a selective reduction would clearly fall under the purview of its abortion statutes.
While selective reduction is not explicitly covered by most
state law definitions of abortion, if state legislatures intend to
impose limits on selective reduction as part of their interest in
protecting fetal life, it is possible that they would amend their
laws to mirror North Dakota’s. However, many state laws contain exceptions that would encompass selective reduction.
First, a selective reduction is arguably most often used as a
means for increasing the probability of a live birth, which is a
136
statutory exception under Oklahoma law. This conclusion is
subject to debate, however, because some women elect to have
selective reductions for reasons other than increasing the prob137
ability of a live birth. In these cases, selective reduction may
not meet the exception of increasing the probability of a live
birth.
Second, many selective reductions may fall under the ex133. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013).
134. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
136. See Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 800 (“Plainly, the principal
purpose of selective reduction is to produce one or more live births. Because
the law seems to define abortion by one’s motivation to avoid producing a live
birth, the legal definition of abortion cannot also include selective reduction.”).
137. See, e.g., Padawer, supra note 101 (relating one woman’s decision to
reduce twins to a singleton based on her concern that because of her age and
financial position, she would not be able to care for two children).
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ception of necessity. In Pennsylvania, for example, an abortion
is permissible if the physician “determines that, in his best clin138
ical judgment, the abortion is necessary.” The statute does
not define the term “necessary” outright, although it provides
139
limitations. The law requires that, in determining necessity,
the physician exercise his or her “best clinical judgment . . . in
light of all factors (physical, emotional, psychological, familial
and the woman’s age) relevant to the well-being of the wom140
an.” A literal interpretation of the law suggests that, should
selective reduction be classified as a form of abortion, it would
permit a physician to perform the procedure based on considerations other than the preservation of the pregnancy or the
health of the mother and the remaining fetuses.
Based on a textual, “plain meaning” interpretation, it is
unlikely that a court would interpret any of the examined state
141
laws, except for North Dakota’s, to apply to selective reduction. The Supreme Court is likely to use this method of interpretation when examining a state statute limiting the right to
142
seek an abortion. If state legislatures intend these laws to encompass selective reduction, however, they can amend their
laws to mirror North Dakota’s. The next Part of this Note assumes that most motivation-based abortion prohibitions could
either be interpreted to apply to selective reduction, or modified
to explicitly include it.
C. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF SELECTIVE ABORTION
PROHIBITIONS TO SELECTIVE REDUCTION
With few examples of actual prosecutions of physicians under these laws, it is difficult to determine how a motivationbased abortion prohibition would apply in a typical abortion
143
case, much less in a case of selective reduction. Assuming
138. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204 (West 2011).
139. Id. (providing that except in cases of emergency, prior to performing
the procedure, the physician must have a private consultation with the woman
to enable the physician to determine whether, based on his best clinical judgment, the abortion is necessary).
140. Id.
141. The phrase, “including the elimination of one or more unborn children
in a multifetal pregnancy” suggests that North Dakota has banned selective
reduction all together. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013). While this
provision raises questions of the law’s constitutionality, a full analysis is outside the scope of this Note.
142. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 939–40 (2000) (determining
that the “plain language” of Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion ban covered two
distinct but similar procedures).
143. Boyd, supra note 19, at 438–42 (concluding that prosecutors would
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that selective reduction could fit within state law definitions of
abortion, and these laws remain unchallenged, access to selective reduction may be limited in the same ways that access to
abortion is limited in these states. If that is the case, physicians
must determine the extent to which they can offer choices in selective reduction. In other words, could state law command that
the choice of which fetuses to reduce and which to keep must be
determined by their fortuitous location in the mother’s womb?
This Section seeks to answer these questions by exploring hypothetical, but probable, situations in which women opt for selective reduction. First, Part II.C.1 analyzes various situations
where a woman carrying multiples discovers that one of them
carries a genetic abnormality. Then, Part II.C.2 explores similar situations where a woman carrying multiples is offered the
144
choice of which fetuses to save or reduce based on sex. Ultimately, this discussion aims to determine whether states can
mandate that the selective reduction of a fetus be based solely
on the fetus’s random location in the womb.
1. Selection as the Sole Motivation for an Abortion or Selective
Reduction
If selective reduction is otherwise permissible, the legitimacy of selecting which fetus to keep and which to terminate
based on sex or genetic abnormality depends on state law. If
the state has enacted a motivation-based abortion prohibition,
the first thing to consider is whether the law is limited to cases
in which sex selection is the sole motivation for the decision.
Therefore, the use of the term “solely” is critical in determining
how different states’ motivation-based abortion prohibitions
face significant hurdles in prosecuting abortion providers in most scenarios
that would arise under Arizona’s motivation-based abortion statute).
144. Arizona’s motivation-based abortion law anticipates a third scenario,
race selection, which is not analyzed in this Note, but warrants a full discussion on its own terms. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011). It is possible that such a prohibition would affect selective reduction and abortion in
ways not anticipated by the statute. For example, there are cases in which
women have given birth to children of different races due to mix-ups in IVF
clinics, raising the question of whether a woman could selectively reduce the
child of a different race, or abort the entire pregnancy rather than carry another’s child. See, e.g., Clare Dyer, Judge Backs Adoption of IVF Mix-Up
Twins, GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2003, 9:25 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
uk/2003/feb/27/claredyer; see also Meredith Rodriguez, Lawsuit: Wrong Sperm
Delivered to Lesbian Couple, CHIC. TRIB. (Oct. 1, 2014, 7:22 AM), http://www
.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-sperm-donor-lawsuit-met
-20140930-story.html (discussing a lawsuit brought by an Ohio woman against
a sperm bank for mistakenly implanting her with genetic material from an
African-American donor, resulting in a mixed-race child).
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might apply to selective reduction.
Presumptively, if a woman has already chosen to undergo a
selective reduction, she has chosen to do so not because she only wants children with or without a particular characteristic,
but because preserving her health and the well-being of the
145
remaining fetuses warrants it, or because she feels that she
146
cannot or does not want to accommodate more than one child.
Thus, the types of motivations generally anticipated by the motivation-based abortion prohibitions discussed in Part I.A.2
would rarely be the sole motivation for a selective reduction.
This is not necessarily the case, however, with respect to twin
pregnancies. Until recently, many physicians did not consider
selective reduction of twins a necessity, and many refused to
147
Although the number of twin-toperform them at all.
148
singleton reductions has increased, it is less likely to be considered a medical necessity than the reduction of high-order
149
multiples. Given the fact that physicians may be less likely to
recommend a selective reduction of twins out of medical neces145. See Committee Opinion No. 553, supra note 2, at 408 (directing that in
cases of high-order multifetal pregnancies, patient counseling should “convey
that multifetal pregnancy reduction increases the chance of achieving at least
one live birth and decreases the risk of a spontaneous loss of the entire pregnancy”).
146. See, e.g., Padawer, supra note 101 (“The idea of managing two infants
at this point in her life terrified her. [Jenny] and her husband already had
grade-school-age children, and she took pride in being a good mother. She felt
that twins would soak up everything she had to give, leaving nothing for her
older children. Even the twins would be robbed, because, at best, she could
give each one only half of her attention and, she feared, only half of her love.
Jenny desperately wanted another child, but not at the risk of becoming a second-rate parent.”).
147. Compare id. (noting that many if not most physicians who perform
selective reductions will not perform a reduction of twins to a singleton if not
medically necessary), with Mark I. Evans et al., Fetal Reduction from Twins to
a Singleton: A Reasonable Consideration?, 104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
102, 102 (2004) (concluding that, given the risk of spontaneous twin pregnancy
loss, the experience of physicians in safely reducing multifetal pregnancies,
and data suggesting that the likelihood of a successful birth is higher after a
reduction of twins, “twin-to-singleton reductions might be considered with appropriate constraints and safeguards”).
148. See, e.g., Padawer, supra note 101 (noting that between 1997 and 2010
at Mount Sinai Medical Center, one of the largest selective reduction providers, the number of overall reductions to a singleton increased from 15% to
60%, and in 2010, 62% of reductions to a singleton were twin-to-singleton reductions).
149. See Mark I. Evans & David W. Britt, Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction:
Evolution of the Ethical Arguments, 28 SEMINARS REPROD. MED. 295, 301
(2010) (recommending “that the obstetrics community not adopt elective twin
reduction as a general practice but refer patients who make this request to
centers with experience in MFPR that also offer counseling about this choice”).
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sity, it is easier to imagine a woman being motivated to reduce
solely by the sex or genetic abnormality of a fetus in a twin
pregnancy.
2. Selection to Avoid Genetic Abnormality
As technologies have advanced to allow earlier detection of
fetal abnormalities, abortions and selective reductions of the
fetuses carrying them have become more common, regardless of
150
whether those abnormalities are life-threatening. The decision to terminate a fetus to avoid having a child with a genetic
disorder is often driven by concern not only for the quality of
life of the child but also the impact on family life and the emo151
tional, financial, or social concerns of the parents. Consider a
woman who has become pregnant with twins after IVF and is
healthy enough to give birth to the twins safely. She intends to
carry both to term until genetic testing reveals that one fetus
carries a genetic abnormality. She then opts for a selective reduction. If her physician is aware of the woman’s intentions
and motivations and willing to perform a reduction from twins
to a singleton, could the physician be prohibited from performing the selective reduction?
152
153
154
155
To date, Indiana, North Dakota, Missouri, and Ohio
are the only states to attempt motivation-based abortion prohi156
bitions focused on genetic abnormality. North Dakota’s law
both prohibits abortions based solely on genetic abnormality or
157
the risk of a genetic abnormality and explicitly includes selec158
tive reduction within the definition of abortion. If the woman’s sole reason for opting for selective reduction is based on
the genetic abnormality of the fetus, then she could face significant obstacles in any state that has enacted a law like North
Dakota’s. If the genetic abnormality could affect the health of
the remaining fetus, then it is possible that she would still be
able to seek a selective reduction under the statutory exception
for saving the life or preserving the health of the unborn
150. See Padawer, supra note 101 (“Many studies show the vast majority of
patients abort fetuses after prenatal tests reveal genetic conditions like Down
syndrome that are not life-threatening.”).
151. Id.
152. S.B. 334, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015).
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013).
154. H.B. 439, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015).
155. H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016).
156. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text.
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1.
158. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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159

child. To avoid risking the harsh consequences of liability, a
physician in North Dakota would likely refrain from performing the procedure and refer the woman to a provider in another
160
state.
Even though North Dakota’s abortion laws explicitly include selective reductions, a more nuanced, text-based interpretation of the statute may also leave some room for the selective
reduction of a fetus with a genetic abnormality if the primary
reason for the reduction is something other than the existence
of the abnormality. The statute prohibits physicians from “intentionally perform[ing] or attempt[ing] to perform an abortion
with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely . . . [b]ecause the unborn child has been diagnosed
with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic
161
abnormality.” The most recent bills in Indiana, Ohio, and
162
Missouri contain similar language. This language leaves a
gap that may allow a pregnant woman to choose which fetus to
keep in a selective reduction procedure, provided that she does
not initially seek the reduction because of the genetic abnormality.
The North Dakota statute is only written to prevent selection in the decision of whether to terminate, rather than which
163
fetus to terminate. In the above scenario, because the woman
did not decide to have a selective reduction until she found out
about the abnormality of one of the fetuses, her physician could
be prohibited from performing the reduction under North Dakota law. Conversely, had she been pregnant with higher-order
multiples and wanted to reduce the number to twins for the sake of her health and the health of the remaining fetuses, the
language of the statute may allow her doctor to perform the se159. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1.
160. Cf. Mark Leach, Does the North Dakota Law Banning Down Syndrome-Selective Abortions Impose an Undue Burden?, DOWN SYNDROME PRENATAL TESTING (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting.com/
does-the-north-dakota-law-banning-down-syndrome-selective-abortions
-impose-an-undue-burden (noting that North Dakotans already face a significant barrier in seeking an abortion to begin with, as there is only one abortion
clinic in the state, and it is in Fargo, on the Minnesota state border). If just
living in North Dakota is enough to prevent a woman from seeking an abortion due to lack of providers, it is likely that she would have to travel to seek a
selective reduction anyway.
161. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (emphasis added).
162. See S.B. 334, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Ind. 2015); H.B. 439, 98th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); H.B. 135, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016).
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14–02.1–04.1.
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lective reduction. In this scenario, she would not be seeking the
reduction because of the genetic abnormality of the fetus, but
she may consider the abnormality as a factor in deciding which
fetuses to reduce and which to keep. Ultimately, however, the
effect of the law is still likely to produce a chilling effect that
discourages North Dakota physicians from performing selective
164
reductions.
The same analysis appears to apply to Missouri’s proposed
165
law. The Missouri bill differs from North Dakota’s law in that
it does not explicitly include selective reduction in its definition
of abortion, although it may be read to implicitly include selec166
tive reduction. In either state, the practical effect may be that
a prudent physician would be unwilling to abort or selectively
reduce a fetus with a genetic abnormality, given the uncertainty of the laws’ application to selective reductions and the harsh
167
penalties for violations. The outcome may be different, however, in the case of high-order multiples.
Consider a similar scenario in which a woman who has
gone through IVF becomes pregnant with triplets or quadruplets. Her doctor recommends a selective reduction for the sake
of her health and the success of the pregnancy and finds that
one of the fetuses carries a genetic abnormality. In this case, a
selective reduction of the fetus carrying the abnormality should
be permissible assuming that the ultimate purpose of the reduction is to preserve the health of the mother and the remaining fetuses, and not solely for the purpose of selection. The inclusion of the word “solely” in the text of the North Dakota law
and the proposed Missouri law would limit the laws’ application in this scenario, because the physician would not be performing the reduction in the first place were it not for the
health of the woman and her pregnancy. Thus, even though
North Dakota law explicitly bans selective reduction based on
genetic abnormality, such a selective reduction would be permissible in cases of high-order multiples.
164. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
165. Mo. H.B. 439.
166. See MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015 (2015) (defining “[a]bortion” as “[t]he act
of using or prescribing any . . . means or substance with the intent to destroy
the life of an embryo or fetus in his or her mother’s womb,” or “[t]he intentional termination of the pregnancy of a mother by using or prescribing any . . .
means or substance with an intention other than to increase the probability of
a live birth or to remove a dead or dying unborn child”). Although selective reduction would fit within the exception that increases the probability of a live
birth, it would be prohibited by the first provision.
167. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
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3. Selection for Sex
There are a number of scenarios in which a pregnant woman undergoing selective reduction may desire sex selection. For
example, consider a woman who has undergone IVF and become pregnant with quadruplets. Three of the fetuses are male,
one is female, and all four are healthy. The woman already has
two sons and has a strong desire for a daughter. Her physician
strongly recommends a selective reduction from quadruplets to
twins or a singleton, and the female fetus is the closest to the
abdominal wall. Is the physician legally permitted to ask the
woman of her preferences? If the physician knows the woman’s
preference for a daughter, could the physician be prohibited
from reducing one of the male fetuses that is more distant from
the abdominal wall instead of the female?
Under the Illinois, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and North
Dakota motivation-based abortion prohibitions, this scenario
would be permissible provided that the ultimate purpose of the
reduction was to preserve the health of the mother and the remaining fetuses and not solely to select for sex. The inclusion of
the word “solely” in the text of these statutes would limit the
laws’ application in this scenario, because the physician would
not be performing the reduction in the first place were it not for
the health of the woman and her pregnancy. Under Arizona’s
motivation-based abortion law, however, this procedure may
not be permitted, because the law prohibits such a procedure if
168
the sex of the fetus plays any role in the decision. Assuming
that selective reduction would be classified as an abortion under Arizona law, a prosecutor would merely have to show that
the physician knew that the sex of the fetuses played a role in
the woman’s decision of which ones to terminate. To avoid liability, the physician in such a scenario would have to decide
which fetus to terminate based solely on a random characteristic—the most logical characteristic being proximity to the ab169
dominal wall.
A more nuanced interpretation of Arizona law makes the
outcome less clear in this context in several ways. First, Arizona’s definition of abortion does not anticipate multifetal preg170
nancies or the need for selective reduction. Second, even if the
law applies equally in all cases, a literal reading of the statute
should not allow the law to govern the choice of which fetus to
168. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
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terminate in most selective reductions. In construing a statute,
courts first consider “whether the language at issue has a plain
and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dis171
pute in the case.” The Arizona statute covers anyone who
“[p]erforms an abortion knowing that the abortion is sought
172
based on the sex . . . of the child . . . .” Because the law does
not anticipate a multifetal pregnancy, it appears the law is
written only to prevent sex selection in the decision of whether
to terminate, rather than which fetus to terminate.
While the term “abortion,” as discussed above, is subject to
multiple interpretations, the remaining language of the statute
is unambiguous. The requirement that an abortion be “sought
based on” the sex of the fetus has a plain and unambiguous
meaning: if a woman learns the sex of the fetus and subsequently decides to have an abortion based on that knowledge,
then her decision falls within the meaning of the statute. For
example, if a woman pregnant with twins, one male and one
female, opts for a selective reduction because she wants only
daughters and the twin pregnancy otherwise poses no major
health risks, her physician would probably not be permitted to
perform the procedure. In such a case, the woman opts for a selective reduction because of the sex of the male fetus, whereas if
both fetuses had been female, she would have carried the full
pregnancy with both twins to term. Conversely, a woman’s decision to seek an abortion prior to identifying the sex of the fetus does not fall within the meaning of the statute. In a scenario involving high-order multiples, for example, it is more likely
that the woman has already decided to terminate one or more
fetuses. Thus, she has sought a selective reduction for the sake
of her health and the safety of the remaining fetuses, and even
if she chooses which fetus to terminate based on its sex, she has
not sought the reduction based on that characteristic.
Third, the application of Arizona’s law to selective reduction can be challenged by a purpose-based approach to statutory interpretation. Such an interpretation suggests that Arizona’s law should not apply in the above scenario. The purpose of
Arizona’s motivation-based abortion prohibition is “to protect
unborn children from prenatal discrimination in the form of be173
ing subjected to abortion based on the child’s sex or race.”
This purpose is based on the perception that such abortions do
in fact occur and that they “are elective procedures that do not
171. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
172. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (2011) (emphasis added).
173. 2011 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 9 (H.B. 2443) (West).
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174

in any way implicate a woman’s health.” The choice of which
fetus to reduce in a selective reduction procedure does not reflect this purpose. First, selective reductions are performed
with the object of reducing or eliminating significant risks to
175
both the remaining fetuses and the mother, and thus they are
not merely “elective procedures” that have no effect on the
woman’s health. Second, denying a pregnant woman the option
to choose which fetus to terminate in a selective reduction does
not necessarily resolve prenatal discrimination. Not all physicians offer their patients the option to select for sex in a selective reduction, and not all patients have the desire to exercise
176
that choice. Given the little evidence of disproportionate discrimination against a particular gender in selective reduc177
tion, it follows that selective reduction is less of a vehicle for
prenatal discrimination than an unfortunate necessity for
women who must avoid the high risks of carrying multiples.
The above analysis suggests that the current regulatory
framework for abortion cannot be usefully applied in the context of selective reduction. First, it is not entirely clear whether
most motivation-based abortion prohibitions would apply to selective reduction procedures, and there are valid arguments
that they should not. Second, this ambiguity could have a
chilling effect on providers who would otherwise recommend selective reduction. Third, allowing motivation-based abortion
prohibitions to regulate selective reduction would not have any
meaningful effect on the social problems that such laws purportedly aim to solve. Considering the growing number of motivation-based abortion prohibitions, the high numbers of multiple pregnancies, and the increasing recognition of risks
associated even with twins, a different legal framework for regulating selective reduction is warranted.
III. LOOKING FORWARD: A VIABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Committee Opinion No. 553, supra note 2.
176. E.g., Padawer, supra note 101 (noting that some patients “want no
part in the decision”). The decision to have a selective reduction can be emotionally painful and psychologically scarring in its own right without the added burden of choosing one fetus over the other. See Lee, supra note 103.
177. First, considering the procedure’s recent development, selective reduction is less common than abortion to begin with. See Evans, supra note 6 (noting that as of 2009, Evans was only “one of a small cadre of experienced, highrisk obstetricians who now offer selective reduction”). Furthermore, there is
evidence that among women who do choose selective reduction, some may elect
to choose the sex of the remaining fetus, while many others do not wish to
have any part in the decision. See supra note 176.
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FOR SELECTIVE REDUCTION
Selective reduction requires a legal framework that separates the procedure from abortion, allows the ART industry to
continue refining its practices, and serves legitimate state interests without unnecessary state intervention in medical decisions. There is no bright-line rule indicating when the risk of
carrying a multifetal pregnancy to term becomes so high that
selective reduction is “necessary” to save the life of the mother
or preserve the pregnancy, and such bright-line rules would
178
make little sense from a health or policy perspective. Allowing states to impose broad limits on selective reduction—for example, making selective reduction permissible where necessary
to preserve the life or health of the mother and/or the remaining fetuses—would require physicians to draw these arbitrary
lines. Therefore, this Note proposes a solution that attempts to
balance the interests of ART patients and the ART industry
with state interests.
Section A proposes that states should enact or amend their
laws to ensure the legal separation of selective reduction from
abortion. Then, Section B proposes that regulatory measures
intended to reduce the need for selective reduction and prevent
abuse of the procedure should for the most part be left to the
medical community. If selective reduction were determined to
be within the ambit of state abortion laws, the above analysis
regarding motivation-based abortion prohibitions suggests that
it may be permissible for states to mandate that selection be
based on random placement. Section C, however, proposes that
because mandating random selection would do little to resolve
state legislatures’ concerns regarding discrimination, states
should be able to impose such a mandate in very limited circumstances.
A. STATES SHOULD LEGALLY DISTINGUISH SELECTIVE
REDUCTION FROM ABORTION
In most states, statutory language leaves it unclear wheth179
er state abortion laws would encompass selective reductions.
Because of the inherent differences between selective reduction
180
and abortion, current abortion laws should not be interpreted
178. See Evans et al., supra note 147, at 105–08 (discussing the benefits as
well as the ethical dilemmas of reducing twin pregnancies that make such
line-drawing impractical).
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
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181

to encompass selective reduction. Whereas motivation-based
abortion prohibitions anticipate the termination of a pregnancy
because of an inherent characteristic of the fetus (such as sex
or genetic abnormality), selection in the context of selective reduction is a necessity—the physician must either choose which
fetus to reduce based on a random characteristic (i.e., proximity
to the abdominal wall) or offer the choice to the patient, who
must choose which fetus to keep based on whatever characteristics can be identified. In selective reduction, the choice generally arises out of medical necessity, whereas in the types of
abortions anticipated by motivation-based abortion prohibi182
tions, the choice typically arises out of preference alone.
From a policy perspective, allowing these laws to limit a
pregnant woman’s choices when undergoing a selective reduction would do little to resolve the issues of discrimination identified by proponents of such prohibitions. The purpose of selective reduction is to diminish the risks posed by high-order
183
multiple pregnancies, rather than to offer parents a “menu”
from which they can choose the fetus with the most desirable
genetic qualities—and there is little evidence that pregnant
women and physicians are abusing IVF and selective reduction
184
in this way. Furthermore, the medical community already
185
generally condemns the practice of sex selection. It is also unclear that prohibiting abortions based on genetic abnormality
would actually resolve discrimination against those who carry
those abnormalities, since a woman living in a state with such
a prohibition can travel to another state to terminate her preg-

181. See Daar, Lifeboat Ethics, supra note 5, at 783 (“A woman undergoing
a ‘traditional’ abortion intends that her entire pregnancy will be terminated:
that following successful completion of the procedure she will no longer be
pregnant. In contrast, a woman undergoing selective reduction intends that
her pregnancy will not be terminated, but rather will be enhanced by creating
a better environment for her fetus(es) to develop. The difference in intent so
separates [selective reduction and abortion] as to render them wholly distinguishable. This distinction should be maintained in the policy-making and political arenas that swirl around the abortion issue.”).
182. See supra note 104–107 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
185. See Committee Opinion No. 360, supra note 23, at 478 (explaining that
while the ACOG accepts sex selection to prevent sex-linked genetic disorders,
it opposes sex selection for other reasons, including discriminatory beliefs and
“family balancing”). The ACOG also acknowledges, however, that patients are
entitled to information including the sex of the fetus, and therefore “it will
sometimes be impossible for health care professionals to avoid unwitting participation in sex selection.” Id.
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186

nancy. Given the purposes of selective reduction, however,
even if prohibiting abortions based on genetic abnormality
would have an anti-discriminatory effect, it is not likely that
such a prohibition would have the same effect in the context of
selective reduction, because the decision to reduce in the first
instance is most often made based on the risks posed by the
pregnancy rather than the characteristics of the fetus. Because
motivation-based abortion prohibitions would do little to resolve discrimination if applied to selective reduction, there is
little value in allowing such laws to apply to selective reduction.
For the sake of providing clarity, particularly for physicians, states should amend their abortion laws to explicitly exclude selective reduction from the definition of abortion. Such a
provision might read, “Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to limit the selective reduction of a multifetal pregnancy
where a physician has determined that selective reduction is in
the best interest of the health of the mother and the remaining
fetus or fetuses.” Such a provision would provide needed clarity, especially in states that have enacted motivation-based
abortion prohibitions. As physicians continue to refine selective
reduction procedures and demonstrate higher success rates,
particularly for women who want to reduce twins to singletons,
this practice will become more prevalent and accessible. Allowing selective reductions to fall within the ambit of motivationbased abortion prohibitions could produce a chilling effect on
those providers in states with the most restrictive laws, given
the high costs of violating such laws. Such a chilling effect
could result in fewer providers offering selective reduction services, adding extensive travel costs to the already immensely
expensive IVF process for women who may have to seek out
providers in other states. Although the total number of physicians that provide selective reductions still remains relatively
low, meaning that many women already have to travel to find a
186. See Alison Piepmeier, Outlawing Abortion Won’t Help Children with
Down Syndrome, N.Y. TIMES: MOTHERLODE (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://
parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/outlawing-abortion-wont-help
-children-with-down-syndrome (arguing that North Dakota’s new abortion law
would not stop women from terminating their pregnancies but instead would
make “an incredibly difficult process even more difficult for them”). But see
Mark Leach, Outlawing Abortion Won’t Help Children with Down Syndrome?
History Might Suggest Otherwise, DOWN SYNDROME PRENATAL TESTING (Apr.
2, 2013), http://www.downsyndromeprenataltesting.com/outlawing-abortion
-wont-help-children-with-down-syndrome-history-might-suggests-otherwise
(noting that “the termination rate [where abortion is outlawed] is still lower
than in countries permitting selective abortion”).
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provider, the need for travel is likely to diminish as the proce187
dure becomes more prevalent and accessible.
It is unclear whether states would opt for this route. The
existence of the provision in North Dakota’s law stating that
abortion includes “the elimination of one or more unborn chil188
dren in a multifetal pregnancy” suggests that some state legislatures may actually lean in the opposite direction. However,
given the continued prevalence of multiples resulting from IVF
and the risks associated with multiple pregnancies, it is urgent
that these state legislatures reconsider the effects that laws
limiting selective reduction might have on women’s health and
the ability of the ART industry to provide healthy pregnancies.
B. STATES SHOULD CONSIDER REGULATORY MEASURES AIMED
AT ENCOURAGING CERTAIN PRACTICES IN THE ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION INDUSTRY
While the ideal solution to the ethical problems contemplated by this Note may be to reduce the need for selective reduction to begin with, it is not clear that most plausible regulations in the ART industry would actually have this effect. The
assisted reproduction industry has made strides toward reducing the occurrence of high-order multiples in the context of
189
IVF, but SART reports show that industry self-regulation
limiting embryo transfers has not yet led to a significant reduc190
tion in the occurrence of twins. This discrepancy is most likely the result of hesitance within the industry to implement a
policy of single embryo transfer. Many doctors will recommend
transferring no more than one embryo at a time to avoid the
risk of multiples, but they are also responsive to the needs and
desires of patients who exert pressure to transfer multiple em-

187. This Note acknowledges that it is not a certainty that the practice of
selective reduction will become significantly more prevalent, especially if industry regulation succeeds in curtailing the number of high-order multiples in
IVF pregnancies. However, considering the present lack of success in reducing
the occurrences of twins, as well as physicians’ increased recognition of the
risks inherent in twin pregnancies, it is likely that selective reduction will continue to progress. See supra note 95 and accompanying text; infra note 199.
188. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2013).
189. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
190. See Clinic Summary Report, supra note 94 (showing that for IVF
pregnancies in women under 35, twin births decreased from 33.5% in 2003 to
28.3% in 2013, while the occurrence of triplets or more decreased from 6.4% in
2003 to 0.9% in 2013, a much more significant change); see also supra note 95
and accompanying text.
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bryos at once to increase the chances of obtaining a pregnancy
191
and bypass the need to go through multiple costly IVF cycles.
The most significant obstacle to effectively regulating selective reduction by limiting embryo transfers is the cost of
IVF. Were the government to adopt, for example, legislation
mandating a policy of no more than single embryo transfers, it
would risk putting desperate patients in the position of having
192
to spend two to three times more to obtain a pregnancy. As
physician and scholar Mark Evans argues:
[A]dopting a program of single embryo transfer in the U.S. won’t work
because the cost of [IVF] is too expensive. At about $15,000, most
couples are willing to accept the possibility of complications and have
a pregnancy versus none at all. In Australia, where the out-of-pocket
cost for I.V.F. is about $400 per cycle, there is relatively little pressure to transfer more than one embryo. Until we get a handle on
193
health care costs, we will continue to see multiple births.

Thus, while the government may feasibly impose a single
embryo transfer limit, such a regulation would most likely only
194
be effective if the government also subsidized IVF. Others
have advocated a policy of promoting single embryo transfers
195
from within the industry. Such a policy might include reminding legislators and insurance companies of the benefits of
reducing multiple pregnancies; encouraging insurance companies to pay the relatively small costs for IVF (as opposed to the
much higher costs of high-risk pregnancy); and modifying the
national reporting system to disincentivize multiple pregnancy
as a measurement IVF success, which could be accomplished by
ceasing to count triplets or higher order multiples as a “success191. See Robert Stillman, Response to The Trouble with Twin Births, N.Y.
TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Oct. 11, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs
.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births (“In our non-single payer health care system and in our national cultural context (with its paramount
legacy of individual rights over those of the state), patient autonomy will almost always prevail.”).
192. See Mark I. Evans, Response to The Trouble with Twin Births, N.Y.
TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (Oct. 11, 2009, 3:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs
.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/the-trouble-with-twin-births.
193. Id.
194. See Judith Daar, Federalizing Embryo Transfers: Taming the Wild
West of Reproductive Medicine?, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 257, 321 (2012)
(“While a standalone federal law can impose embryo transfer limits, the success of any such regime hinges on the compliance patients and physicians are
willing to provide. Changing patient and physician behavior in the surgical
suite will start by neutralizing or reducing the cost each must bear in order to
attain their desired results. A federal mandate to cover or subsidize the cost of
infertility care, as a companion to embryo transfer restrictions, should provide
the necessary incentive for adherence.”).
195. See Stillman, supra note 191.
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ful cycle” and increasing the evaluative weight assigned to
196
births resulting from single embryo transfers. Given the impracticability of a legally mandated single embryo transfer policy, implementing such policies might be the most effective
measure for reducing the need for selective reduction. However,
such policies need not be implemented at the industry level
alone. Federal and state laws imposing reporting requirements
197
already exist, and such laws may be modified with provisions
such as those suggested above to better promote a single embryo transfer policy within the ART industry.
Thus, while state legislatures should refrain from enacting
laws to regulate the embryo transfer stage of IVF as long as the
costs of IVF remain high, those with an interest in reducing
multiple pregnancies and thus the need for selective reduction
should enact, or review and modify, laws that impose reporting
requirements and amend them to better promote a single embryo transfer policy without legally mandating it. States may
not be able to eliminate the need for selective reduction, but
those with an interest in eliminating perceived discrimination
through selective reduction may still be able to permissibly enact separate laws dealing specifically with selective reduction.
C. STATES SHOULD ONLY MANDATE RANDOM SELECTION IN
TWIN-TO-SINGLETON REDUCTIONS, EXCEPT IN CASES WHERE
GENETIC ABNORMALITIES ARE IDENTIFIED
While this Note contends that selective reduction should be
legally separate from abortion, it also acknowledges that some
regulation of selective reduction may be permissible under the
same principles that permit the regulation of abortion. It is
possible that these principles would permit the regulation of
the selection process in selective reduction. As a general policy
matter, states should not intervene in the doctor-patient decision of whether to opt for a selective reduction. However, there
are some cases in which regulation might be permissible. This
Note contends that while it may be permissible for states to
mandate random selection in some cases where sex is the only
distinguishing factor, states should not be able to mandate
random selection where a genetic abnormality exists.
If narrow limitations on motivation-based abortions are
otherwise constitutionally permissible, then states might also
be able to impose similar narrow limits in the selective reduc196. Id.
197. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
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tion context. Given the questionable constitutionality of moti198
vation-based abortion prohibitions to begin with, the most
prudent approach might be to impose the narrowest ban possible. For example, it is possible that states could prohibit selection at the point where selective reduction toes the line between being a necessary procedure and being an elective one—
199
the selective reduction of twins to a singleton. To the extent
that selective reduction resembles abortion, state legislatures
should consider guidelines similar to those articulated by the
Supreme Court in Roe and Casey in drafting laws regulating
200
selective reduction. While this Note argues that states should
take steps to completely eliminate selective reduction from the
201
scope of abortion laws, states could enact other laws under a
different rubric to deal specifically with the issue of impermis202
sible bases for selection in the context of selective reduction.
Such laws might limit patients’ choices by mandating that,
in a twin-to-singleton reduction, the selection of which fetus to
reduce be random. This limitation would ensure that, at least
in twin reduction cases, the decision to seek a reduction is not
motivated solely by the desire to have a child of one sex over
the other. A woman motivated by such a desire would not opt
for a selective reduction in the first place, knowing that she
would not be able to select for the sex of her choice. Such a provision would serve the purpose of state legislatures in enacting
motivation-based abortion prohibitions, if the true goal of such
prohibitions is to eliminate gender discrimination. The practi198. See supra Part II.A.
199. The idea that selective reduction of twins resulting from IVF is elective rather than necessary may be controversial, as doctors are increasingly
recognizing the risks of twin pregnancies. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 192
(“Identical twins are more prone to miscarriage; premature birth; structural
abnormalities of the brain, spine and heart; and have a 10 percent to 15 percent risk of the twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome where the fetuses fight over
the shared blood supply, and fundamentally they both lose. The mother has
higher risks of toxemia and a plethora of other complications including mortality. Although difficult for many to accept, if one defines success as a healthy
mother and healthy family, there is no question that it is safer for a woman
with twins to opt for reduction and give birth to only one child.”).
200. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text.
201. See supra Part III.A.
202. The interests of the states in regulating medical procedures are wellestablished, so such regulation would not be entirely unique. See Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (“There can be no doubt the government
‘has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.’ Under our precedents it is clear the State has a significant role to play in
regulating the medical profession.” (citation omitted) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997))).
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cal effect would be that in the consultation phase, physicians
would inform their patients that should they opt for a selective
reduction, the physician will select the fetus closest to the abdominal wall and that no other characteristics may be consid203
ered.
The validity of such a law would present many more complex issues in the context of a selective reduction based on a
genetic abnormality of the fetus. With respect to the issue of
genetic abnormality, while states may have a strong interest in
eliminating disability discrimination, explicitly prohibiting the
selective reduction of fetuses with genetic abnormalities may
lead to unjust results. Consider a woman who goes through IVF
and becomes pregnant with twins. Her physician performs a
screen and informs her that one of the fetuses carries a genetic
abnormality that is likely Down syndrome. If her state could
prohibit the selective reduction of a fetus on the basis of genetic
abnormality, her physician would not be able to perform the
procedure without running afoul of state law, even though the
physician would ordinarily advise it.
The practical effects of the state’s law could produce a
number of complex moral issues. For example, if the woman in
this scenario were unable to travel outside the state to obtain a
selective reduction, the law would effectively force her to bear
and raise a child with a genetic abnormality. Furthermore,
many women choose to terminate pregnancies in which the fetus carries a known abnormality not because of the added financial or emotional costs of raising the child, but as a “protective measure” based on their own sense of morality and
204
justice. While a full analysis of the constitutionality of this
result is outside its scope, this Note concludes that states
should not enact laws that could potentially lead to the constitutionally questionable results of infringing on procreative liberty and imposing significant financial, medical, and emotional
burdens on the mother.

203. Generally, this would be with the exception of genetic abnormalities,
which the doctor would ordinarily screen for beforehand. See, e.g., Evans, supra note 6.
204. See Piepmeier, supra note 186 (noting that in interviewing several
women who chose to terminate their pregnancies when they learned that the
fetus had Down syndrome, it was not because they wanted a “perfect child,”
but because they feared the problems that their children would face as adults,
including a heightened risk of sexual abuse).
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CONCLUSION
Assisted reproductive technology has brought tremendous
joy into the lives of many hopeful parents, yet this advanced
technology can also lead to devastatingly difficult choices. For
many fertility patients, the joy of finally becoming pregnant
will be tempered by the difficult choice of which fetus or fetuses
to keep in order to ensure a healthy pregnancy. Many patients,
to relieve the ethical and emotional burden of such a difficult
decision, would have their physicians choose which fetus to reduce at random. Others, however, may wish to have the option
to choose the sex of their child. More commonly, those carrying
one or more fetuses with a genetic abnormality may wish to
make their decision based on that knowledge.
Recently enacted state legislation may impose limits on
these choices. The number of states adopting or proposing motivation-based abortion prohibitions is growing rapidly. Interpreted literally, it is not certain that such statutes would encompass selective reduction, but there is a strong argument
that they could. While there is also a strong argument that these laws may be unconstitutional, unless and until their constitutionality is decided, they will continue to apply to motivationbased abortions and may even apply to selective reductions.
Furthermore, even if these laws are found to be unconstitutional, it is likely that state legislatures will modify them to
comply with constitutional requirements. In the meantime, an
increasing number of state legislatures are proposing or enacting motivation-based abortion prohibitions. The mere presence
of these laws could easily produce a chilling effect on providers,
particularly where state law explicitly includes selective reduction within the definition of abortion.
Given the important technical and ethical distinctions between abortion and selective reduction and the low likelihood
that allowing choices in selective reduction will lead to discriminatory results, motivation-based abortion prohibitions should
not be applied in the context of selective reduction. Rather,
states that wish to limit patients’ choices in the selective reduction context should consider revising reporting requirements in
the assisted reproduction industry in order to encourage policies that lead to a decline in the number of multifetal pregnancies and the need for selective reduction. If states wish to eliminate the possibility of discrimination in selective reduction,
they should refrain from adopting anything more than a very
narrow limitation on selection for sex in the reduction of twins
to a singleton. Anything more would unnecessarily burden both
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providers and patients in the process of ensuring healthy pregnancies for patients in need.

